



## Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Recruitment Pattern of Faction Experts in Supporting the Performance of Members of DPR RI for the 2024-2029 Period

**\*Budyono**

Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi Indonesia  
Jakarta, Indonesia

**Diah Pranitasari**

Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi Indonesia  
Jakarta, Indonesia

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**\*Corresponding author:**

Budyono, Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Ekonomi  
Indonesia Jakarta, Indonesia. ✉  
[budyonokasnadi@gmail.com](mailto:budyonokasnadi@gmail.com)

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**Abstract**

**Background:** The Indonesian House of Representatives (*DPR RI*) is mandated by the constitution to exercise legislative, budgetary, and oversight functions. To support these complex constitutional roles, Law No. 17 of 2014 formalized the establishment of Faction Expert Staff (*Tenaga Ahli Fraksi/TAF*) as substantive support for legislators.

**Objective:** This study analyzes the effectiveness of the recruitment patterns of the PDI Perjuangan *TAF* in *DPR RI* for the 2024-2029 period and their impact on legislative, budgeting, and oversight functions.

**Methods:** Employing a qualitative approach with a case study design, primary data were collected through in-depth interviews with key informants from the DPR RI Secretariat General and supporting informants from the PDI Perjuangan *TAF*, alongside secondary document analysis. The data were analyzed using a thematic approach and verified through triangulation.

**Results:** The findings reveal a dualistic recruitment pattern dominated by the logic of party cadre formation rather than competency-based selection. The current formal assessment mechanism is non-binding, leading to patronage practices disguised as meritocracy. Furthermore, an implementation gap exists due to the absence of standardized performance evaluations and independent audits, which triggers moral hazard. All informants confirmed that *TAF* appointments are finalized based on faction recommendations regardless of assessment outcomes. In terms of performance, the ideal role of *TAFs* as policy knowledge brokers has shifted toward acting as personal assistants or justifiers of faction mandates.

**Conclusion:** This study recommends systemic reforms, including the implementation of binding selection instruments, tailored recruitment profiles per commission, output-based performance evaluations, and development of a knowledge management system.

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### INTRODUCTION

Based on the theoretical perspective of the state, the system of power distribution is broken down into three central dimensions consisting of executive, legislative, and judicial institutions. Occupying a position as a legislative organ, the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI) is given absolute authority by the constitution to carry out legislative, budgetary, and supervisory functions. The implementation of legislative capacity is manifested through the agenda of drafting regulations at the legislative level side by side with the

President. Furthermore, the realization of the budget function is focused on the comprehensive review process until the ratification of the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget Bill (APBN). Meanwhile, for supervisory authority, the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia applies it by closely supervising the process of law enforcement and the execution of the state budget by government agencies. These three constitutional functions are explicitly grounded in Article 20A of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD NRI 1945), as strengthened through the Third and Fourth Amendments (2001–2002), which institutionalized the legislative, budgetary, and oversight functions as the foundational pillars of DPR RI authority (Indonesia, 1945).

In order to support this workload, each faction in the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia is facilitated by Faction Experts (*TAF*), which are a line of professionals with scientific specifications who are recruited to supply strategic analysis. The formulation of the existence of experts mandated by Law No. 17 of 2014 is a milestone in parliamentary institutional reform, considering that in the regime of Law No. 27 of 2009, the House of Representatives did not have a special expertise support system other than the secretariat. The existence of experts is very fundamental, because the official views and attitudes of the factions in the plenary forum require a solid basis of argument and require a complete consensus among members. Referring to the official website of the House of Representatives ([dpr.go.id](http://dpr.go.id)), the presence of experts is the driving force of legislative science. This study will specifically dissect the architecture of *TAF* recruitment in the PDI Perjuangan Faction for the 2024-2029 parliamentary period.

So far, the recruitment model of Experts of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, although it is carried out openly, still does not show satisfactory member performance because many of the provisions of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia are much more in political provisions, even though it is known that the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia is a political organization, but what can also be considered is the decree of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia which was previously discussed by the Experts of the Faction, should also always adhere to the people's interests.

In order to ensure quality work output, evaluation instruments are absolutely necessary. Performance assessment instruments are actually used to map the achievements, effectiveness, and productivity levels of the apparatus to be in line with institutional goals (Sedarmayanti, 2020). This governance is very closely related to the discipline of Human Resource Management (HR), which seeks to synergize the governance of the apparatus in order to achieve agency targets while ensuring employee job satisfaction (Yusuf, 2016). The fulfillment of quality talent is highly dependent on a comprehensive procurement (recruitment) design, which is based on workload analysis and organizational strategic planning (Sutrisno, 2016).

The concept of recruitment itself is interpreted as a series of mechanisms to find and attract superior candidates so that they are willing to fill the position formation (Ruky, 2003). Sikula (2001) underline that recruitment is a crucial step for institutions in increasing their operational carrying capacity. Regarding efforts to optimize public services, Sutrisno (2016) suggest that performance evaluation be centered on constituent satisfaction and involve feedback instruments. Yusuf (2016) details that fulfilling organizational targets requires collective commitment, communication transparency, and employee readiness to be evaluated continuously.

This dedication can only be realized if each individual is aware of his or her hierarchical responsibilities (Setyorini et al., 2012). Therefore, the principle of performance accountability is the spirit of good governance, where officials are obliged to report their work results factually, transparently, and comply with regulations (Kurniawan, 2009). Even so, formal mechanisms such as LAKIP are often criticized because they are still too focused on internal target evaluation.

The government, including the law-making organization of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI), is urged to always be accountable and transparent, therefore Experts play a crucial role in the performance of legislators. The demands of the community arise because the DPR has not optimally carried out its functions and is also correlated with the performance of experts in the faction. Legislators often give much more priority to the role of government and budget monitoring than the role of lawmaking, as a result of which the discussion of draft bills (bills) is

hampered. The government in carrying out its monitoring role, the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia only conveys criticism that indicates a reactive nature. The implementation of the roles and duties of the House of Representatives has not been maximized because the system that regulates the work procedures of members has not supported the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of roles and duties as members of parliament. Thus, the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia in recent periods has been faced with a public assessment that seems to be cornered, which reflects systemic failures in the governance of its constitutional roles.

Various problems that occur with the House of Representatives are in the public spotlight. Thus, to improve the image of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, crucial efforts are needed to improve the performance of members. Performance in terms of output achievement can be assessed in line with the actor, namely the output achieved by individuals (individual performance of board members), group (group performance). The low realization of the National Legislation Program is the most obvious data-driven indicator of this systemic failure, which demands a comprehensive reform of the member support system, including the recruitment of Faction Experts.

Quantitative data underscores this urgency: during the 2019–2024 parliamentary period, the DPR RI passed only 23 out of 47 legislatively targeted bills (Prolegnas Prioritas), yielding a completion rate of 48.9%. The Inter-Parliamentary Union framework for evaluating democratic parliaments places Indonesia below regional comparators such as the Philippines and Thailand on indices of legislative staff competency and knowledge management. These findings indicate that expert staff reform is not merely institutional but constitutionally imperative.

The mandate of Law No. 17 of 2014 is the beginning of the birth of Experts of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia which became a new breakthrough in Law 27 of 2009 concerning the People's Consultative Assembly, law-making organizations, Regional Representative Councils and the making of Regional Regulations. Law Number 27 of 2009 previously did not have a *special supporting system* that had a crucial role to support the duties of the entire House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia.

Legislator experts, regulated in Law Number 27 of 2009 concerning council fittings. Law Number 27 of 2009, that in order to support the duties and roles of the law-making organization of the Republic of Indonesia in carrying out its constitutional role, it is considered necessary to have the support of Experts and Administrative Staff Members of the law-making organization of the Republic of Indonesia. that in order for the support of Experts and Member Administrative Staff as referred to in letter a to be carried out effectively, efficiently, and effectively, it is considered necessary to have arrangements regarding the management of Experts and Member Administrative Staff. In addition, it is stated in the Law, in order to implement the provisions of Article 304 of the Regulation of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia Number 1 of 2014, it is necessary to establish a Regulation of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia concerning the Management of Experts and Administrative Staff Members of the law-making organization of the Republic of Indonesia (Regulation of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia Number 1 of 2014: Rules).

Based on Law Number 27 of 2009 Article 2 states that the recruitment of Experts and Administrative Staff of Factions, Members, and AKD who have the capability and integrity in delivering optimal expertise, administrative, or technical support for members, Council Fittings, and Factions so that they can carry out their duties and functions professionally. Regarding the assessment of the performance of Experts and Administrative Staff, both Factions, AKDs, and Members in delivering expertise, administrative, or technical support, optimal for members, Board Fittings, and Factions in carrying out their duties and functions.

The rules on legislator experts have changed repeatedly, and the last one was the change carried out by the legislative body (Baleg) in 2014, at that time the Legislation Body (Baleg) of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia was the party that approved the amendment to the Regulation of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3 of 2014 concerning the Management of Experts and Member Administrative Staff. Considering that there are many provisions that must be adjusted to the legal basis for the formation and the needs of the latest DPR regulation. The Baleg has formed a Working Committee

which is tasked with discussing this draft regulation intensively.

The performance of legislators fundamentally also means the performance of experts, in a democratic country where members work which can be observed in terms of discipline in work, accuracy in work, and cooperation in achieving maximum work productivity. With maximum performance, council members will gain much stronger legitimacy from the community and constituents. A functionally strong parliament is required to build a quality control system and a balance between the council and the government.

So far, changes and improvements have been made to the Regulation of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia to improve the performance of legislators, but it turns out that the improvement of the Regulation of Experts of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia has not been able to fully improve the performance of the council, especially in the current House of Representatives. In addition to the above problems, there are also problems with the recruitment of Experts. The model of recruiting legislators plays a crucial role in a country's political system because the recruitment of experts has been regulated in laws and regulations.

The recruitment and appointment of Faction Experts as stated in Article 8 Paragraph (1) letter c Jo Article 24 Paragraph (1) of the Regulation of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia Number 1 of 2019 concerning the Management of Experts and Legislator Administrative Staff is carried out by Faction leaders for Faction Experts and for Faction Expert Candidates who have fulfilled a series of strict administrative selection processes, assessment, and/or interview and submitted accepted by the leader of the Faction is recommended to be appointed and determined through the decree of the Secretary General.

The birth of the Experts of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia which is mandated by Law No. 17/2014 is a new breakthrough due to Law 27 of 2009 concerning the People's Consultative Assembly, law-making organizations, Regional Representative Councils, and Regional law-making organizations Law Number 27 of 2009 previously there was no special support system that had a crucial role to support the tasks of the House of Representatives. In the previous Law, there was only the Secretary General of the House of Representatives as the only *supporting system* that supports the House of Representatives in the implementation of its duties. The role of law-making in the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia has always been to get a red report card in the eyes of the public in terms of quality as well as in terms of quantity. Likewise, the Legislative Body of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia is an accessory of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia and not a specific special body whose function is also to draft a law, as a result of which it often overlaps with the role of the Commissions in the House of Representatives.

The appointment of Faction Experts is the authority of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, of course this condition is different from the recruitment of Experts which is the authority of legislators although sometimes it is also through expert working procedures, in line with the needs of a number of parties to interpret themselves how the *recruitment system* is designed and held by the Secretary General of the House of Representatives solely to take care of the administrative requirements of the candidate Expert members who register. *Recruitment* is also a closed arena because personal preferences are a crucial factor of personal closeness is often the main consideration over capability. As a result, many of the appointed experts do not have the capabilities to support the work of the relevant legislators, furthermore, this inaccurate recruitment practice cannot be sanctioned because there is indeed no clause that regulates it in the rules on optimal experts in Law Number 17 of 2014 and DPR RI Regulation Number 1 of 2019

The decree of the Secretary General in determining the dismissal of Faction Experts as a decree of State Administration. State Administrative Decree is a written determination issued by a state administrative body or official that contains state administrative legal actions that refer to the applicable laws and regulations, which are concrete, individual, and final, which cause legal consequences for a person or civil legal entity.

The practice of recruiting qualified and qualified and transparent experts has not been implemented. Recruitment of Experts has not been fully open to all qualified applicants, in fact far more are from party activists. The principle of professionalism is very far applied.

The current Expert Recruitment process is suspected to have not implemented a rigid selection procedure, which in turn has an impact on the failure of institutions to attract human resources with superior qualifications. The existence of experts will be considered less essential if their level of knowledge and education level are far below the capacity of legislators. However, from a different point of view, the figure of experts who are equipped with academic skills and comprehensive insight will actually be very vital in order to support the smooth running of the faction's tasks in the House of Representatives. Based on the review in the field, the capacity of the experts studied has actually been included in the qualified category, as evidenced by their high educational background which includes master's (S2) and doctoral (S3) levels. Armed with this capacity, every idea, view, or analysis proposed by the Expert to the council members, especially within the PDI Perjuangan Faction, should be formalized and accepted as the basis for the faction's decision-making.

In the composition of the parliament for the 2024–2029 period, the PDI Perjuangan faction occupies the position of legislator with control of 110 seats, which represents 18.97 percent of the total seats in the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia. This level of representation is the result of obtaining public support as many as 25,387,279 votes or equivalent to 16.72 percent. In order to optimize the performance of the people's representatives, the institution sets qualification standards for the position of Faction Experts, which in principle have the same criteria as Member Experts. The fundamental requirement for this position is the possession of scientific capacity and an empirical track record in the related field. This aims so that they can function as a supporting element of expertise that has a line of direct accountability to council members, factions, and Council Fittings (AKD) within the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia.

Furthermore, the registration stage regulates a number of administrative and technical qualifications that must be met by prospective applicants. The specification requires candidates to have a bachelor's education background (S2) with a Cumulative Grade Point Average (GPA) of at least 3.00, accompanied by at least 2 years of professional experience specifically for the formation of Member Experts. The age limit for applicants is set at a maximum of 62 years old, by attaching proof of English proficiency in the form of a minimum TOEFL score of 450. Additional competencies that are also required include mastery of insights about parliamentary governance, as well as digital literacy which includes the operation of computer devices and the use of the internet. Referring to the information on the [dpr.go.id](http://dpr.go.id) website, the essential tasks carried out by the Expert focus on providing expert reviews in the form of in-depth studies and analysis to support the three main instruments of the council, namely the realm of legislation, budget, and monitoring.

The performance of experts that has not been maximized has implications for the performance of legislators, from the above problems, the researcher is interested in researching "Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Recruitment Pattern of Faction Experts in Supporting the Performance of Members of DPR RI for the 2024-2029 Period (Case Study of the Performance of Faction Expert Staff of the PDI Perjuangan Faction)".

Prior studies on DPR RI expert staff, including Saptomo (2023), Maskur (2024), and Charlina (2023), have separately examined regulatory frameworks, performance correlations, and recruitment mechanisms. However, none has integrated an analysis of the structural dualism between party cadre logic and competency-based selection specifically within the PDI Perjuangan faction under the 2024–2029 parliamentary period, nor examined the consequent impact of a non-binding assessment system on institutional performance. This study addresses that gap by applying principal-agent theory and comparative parliamentary staff analysis to the largest opposition faction in the current DPR RI.

The novelty of this study lies in three aspects: (1) it is the first study to systematically map the "dualistic recruitment logic" of TAF in PDI Perjuangan as a structural phenomenon supported by comparative parliamentary literature; (2) it employs the principal-agent framework to diagnose role ambiguity between TAF's ideal function as knowledge brokers and their actual role as personal assistants or faction legitimizers; and (3) it produces evidence-based policy recommendations tailored to Indonesia's largest opposition faction in the post-2024 election era, contributing to the underdeveloped literature on parliamentary human resource governance in

developing democracies.

This study aims to find out the recruitment pattern of Legislator Experts of the PDI Perjuangan Faction for the 2024–2029 service period and analyze the performance of Legislator Experts in supporting the implementation of legislative duties and functions. This study is expected to be able to make a theoretical contribution to the development of human resource management science, especially related to the role of political parties and the Secretariat General of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia in the recruitment process of experts. In addition, the results of this research can also be used as a reference and reference material for future research that discusses the management of political human resources and legislative institutions.

## METHOD

### Research Focus

The construction of this research is based on a descriptive qualitative approach. This paradigm is believed to be most adaptive to explore the layers of meaning and sociological reality behind the recruitment procedures of experts, rather than reducing them to a series of numbers (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Soekanto (2013) emphasized that qualitative research has an interpretive-holistic tendency, which is explored through regulatory and conceptual approaches. In line with that, Sukmadinata (2011) defines this descriptive method as an analytical instrument to photograph institutional activities and behavior patterns of apparatus as they are. A case study design Creswell (2018) and Yin (2018) was selected as it allows in-depth investigation of the TAF recruitment phenomenon within its real-world institutional context.

The research procedure followed three stages: (1) preparation, including instrument development and access negotiation with the DPR RI Secretariat General; (2) data collection, involving field observations at the PDI Perjuangan faction secretariat, semi-structured interviews conducted between February–May 2025, and secondary document review including DPR Regulation No. 1/2019, internal faction documents, and official DPR performance reports; and (3) data analysis using Braun (2006) thematic analysis framework, which progressed from transcript familiarization, initial coding, theme generation, theme review, definition, and final reporting. Data validity was ensured through source triangulation (comparing interview data with documents and observations) and member-checking with key informants.

### Research Setting

The excavation of empirical data was carried out in the core ecosystem of law formulation, namely within the PDI Perjuangan faction of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, with an observation period ranging from three to four months. The strategy of selecting sources relies on *purposive sampling* to obtain the depth of information from authoritative figures (Moleong, 2006). Prastowo (2010) underlined that the determination of the absolute key informant is based on the competence and mastery of the landscape of the object being studied, which in this study includes the General Secretariat Officials and the ranks of Experts of the PDI Perjuangan Faction.

### Determination of Informants

Based on the formulation of Sukmadinata (2011), the researcher deployed a naturalistic observation technique juxtaposed with a semi-structured oral interview process. Responding to the busyness of Senayan functionaries, intensive interviews were conducted through a combination of face-to-face and teleconference facilities. Data from the field were then dissected using qualitative thematic analysis tools. Mastery of data analysis methodology is the foundation of research efficacy. Therefore, this classification stage adapts the systematic steps of Braun (2006): starting from dialogue transcription, thematic reduction and extraction, mapping of variable clusters (based on recruitment indicators Dessler (2025), Armstrong (2023), Noe (2016), Putra (2025), Robbins (1995), to peer *debriefing*.

### Information Collected

For the research information collected, it targets people who can convey information

related to the question or commonly referred to as an Informant. The researcher chose two types of informants.

### **Key informants**

A key informant is a source of information or a person who knows a variety of information, who can convey crucial information about something. Key informants can also establish access to relevant sources. In this study, the key informant is the Chairman of the Expertise Board of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, who has access to and is very familiar with the recruitment pattern of Faction Experts in supporting the performance of legislators for the 2024-2029 service period.

### **Supporting Informants**

Supporting informants are informants who are determined to refer to knowledge, and often establish formal or informal optimal relationships with the main informant, and really master or understand the recruitment pattern of Faction Experts in supporting the performance of legislators for the 2024-2029 service period of the PDI Perjuangan Faction. In this study, there are two informants, namely Experts of the PDI Perjuangan Faction. Although the number of informants is limited to three individuals, data sufficiency was ensured through a data saturation approach (Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Fusch Ph D & Ness, 2015). Saturation was reached when additional interview data no longer generated new thematic categories. The key informant provided authoritative institutional perspectives on TAF management procedures, while both supporting informants offered convergent experiential accounts from inside the faction's operational environment. Source triangulation across interviews, documents (DPR Regulation No. 1/2019, faction records), and direct observations confirmed the robustness of the data.

## **Data Collection Procedure**

### **Observations**

Referring to the conceptual framework of Sukmadinata (2011), observation is in principle a data collection instrument that relies on the process of direct observation of a phenomenon. Methodologically, this approach is classified into *participatory observation* and non-participatory. The distinguishing point of the two types lies in the level of intervention and involvement of researchers in the field. In the participatory model, the researcher merges and is actively involved in the dynamics of the activities that are the object of the study. In contrast, in the non-participatory approach, the researcher's position is distant from the subject and purely acts as a passive observer without interfering with the course of the activity.

### **Interview**

In addition to observation, this research also accommodates interviews as a data mining instrument. Sukmadinata (2011) defines interviews as a method of collecting information that is very precise and commonly applied, especially in the realm of qualitative descriptive research. Operationally, this question and answer process is designed in a semi-structured format, which is ideally executed face-to-face in both personal and communal capacities, in order to adjust the urgency of the data. However, to respond to the high mobility and the dense agenda of the speakers, the majority of interview sessions were eventually transferred to a virtual format by utilizing digital platforms such as WhatsApp and Zoom.

Interview questions were structured around five thematic domains: (1) understanding and implementation of the TAF recruitment mechanism under DPR Regulation No. 1/2019; (2) perceived role clarity and actual daily functions; (3) performance evaluation experiences; (4) institutional support and knowledge transfer practices; and (5) recommendations for systemic improvement. Field observations (non-participatory) documented TAF operational activities, attendance in commission meetings, and documentation practices during the observation period. Triangulation was achieved by cross-referencing interview data with official DPR documents, faction records, and field observation notes to ensure data validity.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### Results

In summary, the output of this study proves that the efficiency and effectiveness of the Experts of the DPR RI faction have not been maximized. This condition is triggered by four main factors: first, the absence of a structured performance appraisal system; second, the dominance of political trust logic over considerations based on expert ability in recruitment; third, the high rate of staff turnover that interferes with the accumulation of institutional capacity; and fourth, the unclarity of the role that causes Experts not to maximize their substantive roles.

**Finding 1 – Dualistic Recruitment Pattern:** Field data confirmed that the PDI Perjuangan TAF recruitment operates through two parallel but unequal pathways. The formal pathway, administered by the DPR RI Secretariat General under DPR Regulation No. 1/2019, includes an aptitude test covering logical reasoning, verbal ability, and endurance. However, all three informants confirmed that assessment results are non-binding: candidates with unfavorable assessment outcomes may still be appointed if the faction endorses them. The informal pathway, dominated by party cadre regeneration logic, remains the decisive mechanism. As one key informant stated, “the assessment is used to map profiles, not to filter candidates.” This finding confirms the existence of patronage disguised as meritocracy.

**Finding 2 – Performance Role Distortion:** Observation and interview data revealed that the substantive role of TAF as knowledge brokers and policy analysts has systematically shifted toward two dysfunctional roles: (a) personal assistants handling logistical and constituent affairs for individual legislators, and (b) faction justifiers producing arguments that legitimize pre-determined political positions rather than independently informing legislative decisions. Supporting informant testimony indicated that TAF participation in actual bill drafting (DIM preparation) is minimal and often limited to administrative formatting of materials provided by members or faction leaders.

**Finding 3 – Institutional Memory and Turnover:** High turnover of TAF personnel, particularly following electoral transitions, consistently disrupts the accumulation of institutional knowledge. The absence of a structured knowledge management system means that expertise developed during one parliamentary period is not systematically transferred to incoming TAF, resulting in recurring knowledge gaps at the beginning of each new period. **Finding 4 – Absence of Performance Accountability:** No standardized KPI system or output-based evaluation mechanism exists for TAF performance. Assessment is left entirely to the subjective judgment of individual legislators, creating perverse incentives for TAF to prioritize short-term member satisfaction over substantive analytical contributions.

On the positive side, the existence of experts is still recognized as a necessity considering the complexity of constitutional tasks that are impossible for individual members to carry out without adequate substantive support. DPR regulation No. 1/2019 has conveyed a formal framework that has become a foothold, although its implementation still requires real strengthening.

### Discussion

#### ***Theoretical Synthesis: Expert Personnel in the Framework of Political Appointee***

The phenomenon of Experts of the DPR RI faction can be understood through the conceptual framework of politically appointed officials in the context of lawmaking. In contrast to career bureaucrats who enter office through the meritocratic route, Faction Experts are part of discretionary appointments that are inherent in the political interests of members and factions. In the comparative political science literature, this model is known as party-based hiring in which loyalty and trust are no less important prerequisites than technical capabilities.

Nevertheless, a sound party-based recruitment system requires adequate accountability procedures to ensure that political trust does not completely replace capability. In the context of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, this accountability procedure has not been adequately formed. The absence of structured performance appraisals, the absence of standardized work output objectives, and the absence of a series of checks of the recruitment process, make this system vulnerable to moral risks where Experts can maintain their positions solely due to political trust, without the need to indicate measurable roles and substances.

***Institutional Synthesis: The Mismatch between Regulatory Design and Practice***

DPR Regulation No. 1/2019 has conveyed a formal framework that regulates the qualification requirements for Experts. But there is a real mismatch between regulatory design and actual practice. First, the regulations set minimum educational eligibility requirements, but do not set out procedures to ensure that those qualifications are followed by actual Performance capacity. Second, the regulation does not convey the obligation of structured performance appraisal, as a result of which the eligibility requirements for input (recruitment) are not balanced with output quality standards (performance).

This gap reflects what in the study of public strategic provisions is referred to as the implementation gap, namely the distance between the objectives of strategic provisions and the reality of their implementation. As long as this mismatch is not overcome through regulatory revisions or strengthening the institutional capacity of the Secretary General, the efficiency and effectiveness of Experts will continue to depend on individual factors (personal qualities of each TA and member) rather than systemic factors.

***Functional Synthesis: Ideal Roles versus Actual Roles***

The synthesis of all research findings focuses on one fundamental problem: the gap between the ideal role and the actual role of Faction Experts. From a regulatory perspective, the Expert is designed as a bridge between the substantive needs of members and the complexity of the series of strategic decision-making processes in the DPR. They are required to be able to fill the knowledge gap left by the political background of members who are not always meritocratic.

But on a practical level, this role is often distorted into one of two extreme poles: first, Experts are reduced to justifying the mandate of the faction without space to convey the color of substance; and second, Experts who function as personal assistants of members without participation in lawmaking, budgeting, or monitoring roles. These two poles are both not in line with the ideal role of experts as providers of the knowledge base for strategic decisions.

The resource person himself expressed a fairly sharp view: if the output of the Expert is still the same as the output of the Secretary General, then there is one step missed in the value chain of TA participation. This view implicitly identifies the added value that should be provided by Experts, namely the ability to color the direction of strategic decisions with a neutral but high-value substantive perspective, something that cannot (and should not) be carried out by the Secretary General.

***Policy Implications: Towards a More Accountable and Effective System***

Referring to the synthesis above, at least four strategic stipulation implications are found that need to be considered. First, measurable performance standards are needed in the form of setting minimum work output goals for Experts, such as the number of studies, official memoranda, or analysis of strategic provisions produced per certain period. Without these standards, the efficiency and effectiveness of Experts will continue to be subjective and difficult to account.

Second, it is necessary to develop a much more contextual assessment procedure. The standard ability test tools currently used are not enough to identify the capacity of Experts in carrying out specific roles of the DPR. The development of an assessment center specifically designed for the context of lawmaking, although it requires much more significant investment, is needed to be the Secretary General's medium-term agenda.

Third, it is necessary to strengthen supply capacity. The briefing currently given by the Secretary General is still administrative-technical. It is necessary to provide a substantial debriefing that includes an in-depth understanding of the series of legislation processes, budget analysis, and monitoring procedures, as a result of which Experts can immediately contribute substantially once they start their duties.

Fourth, it is necessary to build an integrated TA participation documentation system. Without an adequate recording system, it is not possible to assess the participation of experts, optimal for the interests of members and for the interests of public accountability much broader.

### ***Synthesis Conclusion***

Overall, the existence of Experts of the DPR RI faction is an institutional necessity. No lawmaker anywhere can carry out the complex roles of representation, legislation, financing, and monitoring without the support of an adequate expert staff. However, this inevitability will only be realized effectively if supported by a recruitment procedure that balances political trust with expert ability, a structured assessment system, and clarity of roles that distinguish the role of Experts from the role of personal assistants and from the role of the Secretary General.

This study reveals that the current system is still far from this ideal condition. Comprehensive institutional reform ranging from regulatory revisions, strengthening the capacity of the Secretary General, to building a culture of accountability Performance within the faction is a prerequisite for Faction Experts to truly be able to carry out their functions as providers of the knowledge base of strategic provisions that are crucial for legislators.

### ***Recruitment Pattern of Experts of the PDI Struggle Faction of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia for the 2024-2029 Period***

Institutional Context: The Largest Faction in the Changing Political Landscape

The PDI Perjuangan faction is the faction with the most seats in the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia for the 2024-2029 term, with 110 seats out of a total of 580 seats or equivalent to 18.97 percent of the overall parliamentary composition. But this numerical greatness is present in a paradox that directly shapes the need for substance for its experts: PDI Perjuangan is the only significant party that does not place cadres in the Prabowo-Gibran Cabinet. The PDI Perjuangan chose a position as a counterweight (balancing party) supporting the government from outside but with a critical capacity that was still maintained.

This role as a counterweight from an institutional point of view is different from the official opposition in the parliamentary system, but it is also different from the coalition parties in the government. PDI Perjuangan does not have access to the information resources of ministries and organizations like the coalition parties, but at the same time it is not politically bound to always support the executive agenda. Researchers from the Indonesian Parliament Concerned Community Forum (Formappi) warned that without an effective balancing force, the roles of the House of Representatives in legislation, financing, and monitoring have the potential to become dull.

This context contains very specific implications for the design of the needs of the PDI Perjuangan Faction Experts. First, because there are no cadres in the executive, Experts are the only source of information of sufficient substance for faction members in dealing with government-controlled commission partners. Second, the role of a counterbalance requires experts who are able to operate in two modes at once: a critical-analytical mode to produce credible alternative strategic decisions, and a constructive-collaborative mode to support government programs that are aligned with the public interest. Third, a study of the dynamics of Indonesia's lawmaking after the 2024 election reveals that the series of law-making processes is increasingly concentrated on the agenda of coalition supporters of the government, as a result of which the opposition's bargaining position or counterweight is highly dependent on the capacity of substantive argumentation that can be produced.

### **Recruitment Patterns: Logical Dualism and Its Structural Configuration**

Referring to the findings of the research, the recruitment model of PDI Perjuangan Faction Experts is identified as a structural dualism system that brings together and often contradicts two different logics: the consideration of party cadre regeneration and the logic of capability-based strict selection. The two do not operate separately, but rather in the same hiring procedure but with unequal weight.

The consideration of cadre regeneration reflects the organizational character of PDI Perjuangan as a party with a relatively structured tradition of cadre training. The RSIS (2024) study on PDI Perjuangan after the 2024 election identified regeneration as a major obstacle for the party going forward, considering the need to balance the promotion of internal cadres with the need to present figures who have strong substantive capacity. On a practical level, the recruitment of Experts is often an extension of this regeneration system: the position of Experts

is used as a forging arena for young cadres who are considered potential, as well as a form of appreciation for activists who have contributed to the party's victory in elections.

The logic of capability-based strict selection, on the other hand, is represented through an official assessment procedure facilitated by the Secretary General of the House of Representatives referring to House Regulation No. 1/2019. In this pathway, candidates take an aptitude test that includes endurance, logical intelligence, and verbal ability, with outputs categorized into three levels of recommendation. But the findings of the study reveal a decisive paradox: the outcomes of these assessments are non-binding. Candidates with unrecommended predicates can also still be appointed if they have received a recommendation from the faction or members. This means that the formal strict selection instrument that exists fundamentally functions solely as a profile mapping tool to describe the candidate's profile rather than as an actual strict selection instrument.

This condition is confirmed by research by Maskur (2024) on the PPP Faction which found that the contradiction of these two logics produces a very heterogeneous profile of Experts: some have a strong substantive capacity but much looser loyalty, others have high loyalty but still inadequate technical capacity. The research of Charlina (2023) which specifically examined the administrative staff of the PDI Perjuangan Faction confirmed that the quality of the recruitment process series has a real correlation with the performance produced, a finding that indirectly underlines how important it is to improve recruitment design before hoping for performance improvement.

#### Recruitment as an Instrument of Regeneration: A Cross-Parliamentary Comparative Analysis

In the comparative literature on parliamentary staff, the phenomenon of recruitment based on party regeneration or what in scientific terminology is referred to as party-based recruitment is a phenomenon that is optimally documented in various parliamentary systems around the world. Moens (2023) in a comparative study published in *Parliamentary Affairs* developed a matrix of parliamentary staff roles that distinguishes between plenary staff (neutral and merit-based) and party-group staff (partisan and trust-based).

Brandsma (2024) comparative data compiled from various parliaments in Europe indicate that the staff of almost universally recruited parties refer to political trust, while the emphasis on technical qualifications varies markedly depending on the institutional traditions of each parliament. What is interesting is that in parliaments with strong party-based recruitment traditions, such as in Belgium and the Netherlands, which are the subject of Moens' (2023) study, internal party procedures are found that ensure that recruited staff have the minimum substantive qualifications related to their positions. This condition is because the party has an incentive to ensure that its staff is competent: staff excellence is only achieved if the staff they have are indeed much more optimal than the staff owned by the opponent.

A critical gap in the context of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia and the PDI Perjuangan faction in particular is the absence of similar internal procedures. The incentives for parties to recruit truly competent experts are not strong enough, partly due to the lack of measurable quality competition between factions, and partly because the existing performance appraisal system (or much more precisely: the non-existent) system does not provide feedback that can drive improvement.

#### Structural Criticism: Patronage, Meritocracy, and Systemic Inoptimality

From the perspective of public administration theory, the existing recruitment model places the recruitment procedure for Experts of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia in a category that Oliveira (2024) refer to as politicized recruitment in which considerations of political loyalty dominantly determine the appointment provisions. Oliveira (2024) structured review of 96 data-driven articles from 56 different journals concluded that politicized hiring consistently correlates negatively with the quality of organizational performance, although the magnitude of the impact is highly dependent on the institutional context and accountability procedures available.

The findings of Colonnelli (2020) in *The Journal of Politics* convey a crucial nuance: a system that combines patronage with meritocracy can produce outcomes that are much more

optimal than pure patronage, as long as there is a component of strict selection based on capabilities that binds meaning, not merely a formality that can be ignored. This is precisely the fundamental weakness of the current procedure for recruiting Experts of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia: its meritocratic component is not binding. Assessments exist, but the results can be ignored. Thus, the existing system cannot be categorized as an effective hybrid, but rather as a patronage with a purely meritocratic polish.

Indonesia's context adds its own layer of complexity. A study by Deni (2025) in the Journal of Public Policy and Administration found that in the Indonesian bureaucratic system, recruitment influenced by political considerations tends to produce loyal human resources but their capacity is not always related to the needs of the organization's substance. In the context of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, this phenomenon is exacerbated by the absence of a Performance feedback procedure that can encourage Experts and members to be aware of and address existing capacity gaps.

#### Regulatory Framework: Between Normative Ambition and Implementive Reality

DPR regulation No. 1/2019 is the only formal instrument that regulates the recruitment and management of experts in the House of Representatives. This regulation sets fairly strict input standards, minimum S2 qualifications, with a diverse composition of disciplines, but contains two fundamental regulatory vacancies. First, there is no provision that governs the qualification of the input must be validated independently, as a result of which verification is left entirely to a series of administrative processes that do not have a cross-verification procedure. Second, there are no provisions that regulate the output standards or performance assessments of Experts after they are appointed.

Saptomo (2023) in Nestor: Tanjungpura Journal of Law From a regulatory perspective identifies that "the obstacles faced in the support of legislators' experts are sourced from the procedures for recruiting experts and knowledge of the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of duties and roles and the lack of detailed rules on member experts." This finding places the weakness of regulation not as a purely technical-administrative issue, but as a constitutional problem: as long as the regulation does not ensure the quality of adequate experts, the constitutional roles of the House of Representatives cannot be carried out optimally.

**Table 1.** Analytical Mapping of the Characteristics of Two Identified Recruitment Pathways

| <b>Dimensions of Analysis</b> | <b>Internal Regeneration Path</b>                                      | <b>Cadre Open Selection Pathway</b>              |
|-------------------------------|--|--|
| Legitimacy base               | Political trust and party loyalty                                      | Formal qualifications and external assessments   |
| Decision mechanism            | Faction/member recommendations: mandatory and binding                  | Third-party assessment: non-binding              |
| Candidate profile             | Party cadres, activists of the organisation's wings, internal networks | General experts, academics, practitioners        |
| Comparative advantages        | Understanding of the political context, high loyalty                   | Substance capacity is much more verified         |
| Systemic risk                 | Asymmetry of capabilities, moral hazards                               | Gap in understanding the context of the fraction |
| Performance accountability    | Depends on member satisfaction (subjective)                            | Depends on member satisfaction (subjective)      |
| Critical notes                | Dominant in almost all PDI-P factions                                  | Limited to AKD formations/new members            |

Source: research analysis outputs, processed from interview data (Charlina et al., 2023; Maskur, 2024; Saptomo, 2023).

## ***Performance of Experts of the PDI Struggle Faction of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia for the 2024-2029 Period***

### **Theoretical Framework: From Conventional Performance Models to Role Theory**

Faction Expert Performance Analysis requires a theoretical framework that goes beyond the conventional Performance model based on quantitative output. The position of Faction Expert contains a complexity of roles that are inherently political, substantive, and relational as well as a characteristic that cannot be fully captured by the Performance measurement model designed for the regular bureaucracy.

In the HR management literature, the framework of Bernardin (2007) offers six related dimensions of Performance: quality, quantity, timeliness, cost efficiency, independence, and interpersonal impact. Prakoso (2019) applied this framework referring to field facts on the Gerindra Faction Experts of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia and found that the performance of experts is highly determined by the accuracy of work, the accuracy of deadlines, and the ability to build effective communication with members. But this framework has limitations: it measures how well a person works, but it does not answer a much more fundamental question: working toward what goal? In the context of Faction Experts who do not have officially determined work output goals, Performance measurement without the sole purpose of clarity will produce the illusion of accountability.

A much more appropriate theory for mapping the performance of Faction Experts is the principal-agent relationship theory as developed by Moe (1985) in the context of political positions. In this framework, Experts are positioned as agents of two principals who simultaneously have different interests: members of the House of Representatives as individual principals who want direct support in daily activities, and fractions as collective principals who need analytical capacity to carry out their political roles. The conflict of interest between these two principals, which is the source of the phenomenon of role uncertainty that has not been properly diagnosed, is the root of the most basic Expert Performance problem.

### **The Recruitment-Performance Paradox: When Inputs Don't Guarantee Output**

A most striking paradox identified in this study is what can be termed as a recruitment-performance disconnect: a series of recruitment processes that have gone through formal channels (assessments, qualification verification) do not necessarily produce much more optimal performance, while experts recruited through cadre training pathways do not always perform much lower because deep knowledge of the political context is also capital is very valuable in the work environment of lawmaking.

This paradox can be described through the concept of staffing style developed by Byers (2023) in American Politics Research. They found that the decisions of lawmakers in designing their staff were greatly influenced by electoral calculations and constituent needs, rather than merely the substantive needs of lawmaking. In the context of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, the same calculation operates: members who are strongly oriented towards constituent services will tend to choose experts who are skilled in the absorption of aspirations and field activities, while members who are active in the commission's series of legislative processes will much more appreciate the analytical capacity of strategic provisions. As a result, there is no one universally "maximum" Expert profile that exists is the compatibility between the Expert profile and the staffing style of the member concerned.

The implications of these findings are very real for the recruitment design of the PDI Perjuangan Faction: an effective recruitment procedure is not only necessary to screen candidates with reference to general qualifications, but also to match candidates with specific profiles of members' needs. As a faction with 110 members spread across various commissions with very different issue characteristics, this need is increasingly complex and cannot be met through a uniform recruitment design.

### **Performance in the Three Functions of the House of Representatives: An In-Depth Analysis**

The participation of experts in the three roles of the DPR, namely legislation, financing, and monitoring, needs to be examined not only in terms of whether they contribute, but how and how much the substance of the participation is.

In the role of lawmaking, the main duties of Experts include the preparation of the Problem Inventory List (DIM), analysis of draft bills, and the preparation of arguments in legislation meetings. Saptomo (2023) From a regulatory perspective, it is emphasized that this is the essence of the role of Experts: delivering expert reviews on certain issues in the form of studies and analysis. But on a practical level, this participation is often distorted by what the sources of this study call as justifying the mandate of the faction where experts are asked to produce arguments that support political positions that have been determined much earlier by the faction, rather than positions built from independent substantive analysis. This distortion directly weakens the quality of the legislation produced.

In the financing role, Experts function to support members in a series of State Budget discussion processes in the Budget Agency and in commissions. The PDI Perjuangan faction placed Said Abdullah as Chairman of the House of Representatives Budget Agency for the 2024-2029 term, which conveyed that this faction is a crucial position in a series of financing processes. However, this crucial position can only be utilized optimally if the Experts who support the members of the Budget Agency have adequate fiscal analysis capacity. The weakness of the Expert in this dimension means the weakness of the faction as a whole in using its strategic position for the public interest.

In the role of government monitoring, which is a critical dimension for parties that are not in the coalition supporting the government, Experts function in preparing critical questions to ministries/organizations' partners, analyzing performance reports, and identifying deviations in strategic provisions. Research by Furnas (2023) proves experimentally that the availability of quality information from expert staff has a causal influence on law-making actions taken by parliamentarians. In a different way: Experts who are weak in substance do not only fail to produce optimal analysis, they actively limit the capacity of members to carry out effective government monitoring roles.

### **Experts as Knowledge Brokers: Potential and Gaps**

The concept of knowledge intermediaries developed in comparative parliamentary staff literature offers the most appropriate rule-based framework for describing the ideal role of Faction Experts. Moens (2023) classically formulated that law-making staff function as brokers of information between the outside world and parliamentarians. But this concept has come a long way: Moens (2023) in Government and Opposition operationalized the concept of staff excellence through a data-driven survey of 1,009 political staff in Belgium and the Netherlands, proving that parties with far more highly qualified staff and much more relevant specialties consistently have an advantage in law-making debates.

In the context of the PDI Perjuangan faction as a balancer, the superiority of the staff has a very high resonance. Without access to government information, this faction relies almost entirely on the capacity of its experts to produce analyses that can match or even exceed the quality of information possessed by the commission's partner ministries. Experts who do not function as effective intermediaries of knowledge mean that the fraction enters the courtroom with much poorer information than their government counterparts, an imbalance that directly undermines the efficiency and effectiveness of mutual monitoring procedures.

Moens (2023) further found that in parliaments with a strong party-in-government tradition (such as Belgium), staff in ministerial offices have a clear staff advantage over parliamentary staff. But in a system that is much more parliament-focused (such as the Netherlands), the staff of the parties on the other hand have a much more significant capacity. Indonesia, as a multiparty presidential system, has a hybrid characteristic: government access to information is highly concentrated in coalition parties, as a result of which parties outside the coalition such as PDI Perjuangan face structural limitations in access to information, which can only be compensated through serious investment in the capacity of their experts.

### **The Institutional Memory Crisis: The Hidden Impact of Turnover**

One of the most critical but most often overlooked research findings is the impact of staff turnover on the institutional memory of the faction. With a staff turnover rate of 50-100 people per month nationwide, each wave of Expert turnover brings with it undocumented knowledge, a

network already built, and contextual understanding that cannot be easily passed on to its successors.

McKee (2023) on the staff of UK parliamentarians explicitly identifies "a high staff turnover rate, with staff taking valuable institutional memory with them" as a major structural obstacle to the efficiency and effectiveness of law-making staff. Alexander (2022) in the *Journal of European Integration* indicates that in European Parliament committees, the high turnover of staff members and staff consistently correlates with a decline in the quality of legislation resulting from a series of processes of accumulation of strategic planning expertise that take time and cannot be replaced instantly by new recruits.

In the context of the PDI Perjuangan faction, this institutional memory crisis has a much more serious dimension because its role as a counterbalance demands the continuous accumulation of knowledge about the government's track record of strategic decisions, the pattern of law-making behavior of the commission's partners, and the map of the interests of key actors in the executive organization. When the Expert who has accumulated this knowledge comes out optimally due to his own choice or due to PAW, the knowledge is lost with his departure, and his replacement must start from scratch. In the medium term, this condition structurally weakens the capacity of the faction to build a consolidated, evidence-based monitoring argument.

### **The Absence of Performance Accountability: Structural Analysis**

The absence of a structured expert performance appraisal system is not merely an administrative weakness, it is a reflection of institutional choices that implicitly prioritize trust over capability. When performance appraisals are left entirely to the subjective judgment of members, the incentives for Experts are also distorted: instead of investing capacity to produce quality strategic determination analysis (whose long-term and hard-to-see impacts) are much more driven to meet the short-term needs of members who are much more visible and feel to accompany activities, prepare physical meeting materials, or assist with constituent affairs.

the Performance of Gerindra Faction Experts explicitly recommends a review of the TA Performance assessment system which is solely based on subjective assessment of members. Even more radical recommendations have emerged: if recruitment is still entirely carried out by members without external verification procedures, the position of Experts will forever be vulnerable to biased assessments and do not reflect their true roles. In the context of the PDI Perjuangan Faction, this vulnerability is even more significant due to the significant scale of the faction (110 members) making standardization of performance a much more complex coordination hurdle.

What also needs to be observed is that the absence of Performance accountability creates a condition where underperforming Experts do not face clear institutional consequences. The only available consequence is the non-renewal of members, which is rare due to the personal relationships of trust inherent in the regeneration-based recruitment model. This creates what in organizational theory is referred to as strict selection that is detrimental to equilibrium: in the long run, an unaccountable system tends to retain adequate but not excellent experts, while the best experts who have other career options will leave the system.

### **Direction of Update: Synthesis of Evidence-Based Recommendations**

Referring to all the above analysis, strengthening the performance of the PDI Perjuangan Faction's Experts requires systemic reforms, not patchwork. At least five dimensions of reform are needed to be considered simultaneously.

First, recruitment design reform. The existing assessment procedures are required to be transformed from a profile mapping tool into a rigorous selection instrument that is binding for the dimensions of minimum capability. This does not mean eliminating the consideration of political trust, but rather ensuring that the trust and capabilities of both are fulfilled as a prerequisite that cannot be replaced.

Second, differentiation of recruitment profiles. The PDI Perjuangan faction, which has 110 members in various commissions, needs to develop a specific profile of expert needs per commission reflecting the different analytical needs between Commission I (defense-foreign affairs), Commission XI (finance-banking), and Commission X (education-culture), for example.

One-size-fits-all hiring (one-size-fits-all) is no longer adequate.

Third, the development of an output-based assessment system. In the context of law-making staff, it is necessary for the faction to set measurable minimum work output goals: the number of studies, the strategic determination memo, or the analysis of the DIM per period. This system does not have to be punitive, but is designed to deliver constructive Performance feedback to Experts and members.

Fourth, institutional memory management. It is necessary to build a knowledge management procedure that can capture and document the knowledge brought by Experts, as a result of which rotation or replacement does not always mean the loss of the accumulated intellectual capital that has been built. This can include internal databases, a structured briefing system for new Experts, and knowledge transfer procedures between Experts.

Fifth, Performance-based compensation differentiation. The research of Charlina (2023) which found a real correlation between compensation and Performance is required to be translated into concrete strategic stipulations. The currently uniform compensation system is required to be reformed to accommodate differentiation based on qualifications, specialisations and measurable participation a recommendation that is in line with the spirit of the IPU in the framework of the Indicators for Democratic Parliaments which emphasises the importance of adequate staff capacity as a prerequisite for effective parliament.

**Table 2.** A comprehensive matrix of identified performance conditions, their theoretical basis, and literature-based recommendations

| Performance Aspects    | Empirical Conditions & Root Problems  | Literature-Based Recommendations  |
|------------------------|---|---|
| Recruitment design     | Logical dualism; non-binding assessments; Dominating Patronage                            | Hybrid recruitment with a binding meritocratic component (Colonnelli et al., 2020; Oliveira et al., 2024) |
| Role clarity           | Role ambiguity: between knowledge brokers, fractional justifiers, and personal assistants | Role differentiation based on principal-agent relationships (Moe, 1985; Moens, 2023)                      |
| Performance evaluation | Systemic absenteeism; subjective assessment of members                                    | Output-based KPIs with 6 dimensions (Bernardin, 2007)   |
| Institutional memory   | High turnover; loss of institutional memory   | Knowledge management system; structured handover (Alexander, 2022; McKee, 2023)                           |
| Staffing advantage     | Not measurable; Not consciously programmed  | Investment in staff qualifications and specialization (Moens, 2023)                                       |
| Compensation           | One rate; no performance-based incentives   | Differentiation of compensation based on qualifications and output (Charlina et al., 2023)                |
| Profile per commission | Uniforms; does not reflect different substance needs                                      | Matching TA profiles with specific commission needs (Byers & Shay, 2023)                                  |

Source: research analysis outputs, compiled from interview findings and comparative literature review (2022-2025)

In the end, the efficiency and effectiveness of the PDI Perjuangan Faction Experts is a reflection of the quality of democracy that is being fought. As a balancing faction that does not have access to executive resources, the quality of Experts is not solely an internal administrative issue, it is a prerequisite for the faction to be able to carry out the role of a substantive and not merely symbolic supervision procedure. Competent experts supported by an optimal system is an investment in the quality of democracy itself.

## CONCLUSION

This study concludes that the TAF recruitment system of the PDI Perjuangan faction in the 2024–2029 DPR RI period exhibits a structural dualism in which formal meritocratic procedures (aptitude assessments under DPR Regulation No. 1/2019) are consistently overridden by party-

based political appointments. This creates a patronage system disguised as meritocracy, leading to three compounding performance deficits: (1) role ambiguity, where TAF shift from knowledge brokers to personal assistants or faction legitimizers; (2) institutional memory loss, caused by high turnover without structured knowledge transfer mechanisms; (3) adverse selection equilibrium, where the absence of binding performance accountability perpetuates underperformance without institutional consequences.

This study contributes to the principal-agent literature in parliamentary contexts by demonstrating how competing principals (individual legislators versus collective faction interests) produce role distortion in expert staff, a mechanism not previously documented in the Indonesian parliamentary literature. Departing from an analytical exploration in the domain of parliamentary governance, this study emphasizes that the formulation of recruitment of experts of the PDI Perjuangan faction is still dominated by structural contradictions, where the stages of meritocracy through technocratic tests are often subordinated by the supremacy of party political recommendations. In addition, the absence of a post-appointment audit mechanism also weakens the culture of accountability because experts can maintain their positions through political relations without the obligation to show concrete expertise achievements. In practice, the ideal function of experts as analytical brokers has also been degraded to mere administrative instruments or legitimizers of the interests of political patrons, thereby reducing the substance of the board's supervisory function.

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#### AUTHOR CONTRIBUTION STATEMENT

Budiyono conceptualized the study, designed the research methodology, collected and analyzed the data, interpreted the findings, and prepared the original manuscript. Diah Pranasari supervised the research, contributed to the theoretical framework, validated the analysis, critically reviewed the manuscript, and provided substantial revisions to improve its academic quality. Both authors read and approved the final version of the manuscript and agree to be accountable for all aspects of the work.

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